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Abstract. The taxation of multi-national companies is a complex field,
since it is influenced by the legislation of several states. Laws in different
states may have unforeseen interaction effects, which can be exploited by
allowing multinational companies to minimize taxes, a concept known as
tax planning. In this paper, we present a knowledge graph of multina-
tional companies and their relationships, comprising almost 1.5M busi-
ness entities. We show that commonly known tax planning strategies
can be formulated as subgraph queries to that graph, which allows for
identifying companies using certain strategies. Moreover, we demonstrate
that we can identify anomalies in the graph which hint at potential tax
planning strategies, and we show how to enhance those analyses by in-
corporating information from Wikidata using federated queries.
Keywords: International taxation · Tax haven · Tax planning · Knowl-
edge graph · Graph Anomaly · Federated Query
1 Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNCs), such as Google, IKEA, and Apple, have
been scrutinized in the recent decade for so-called “aggressive” tax planning
strategies. Taxes have a considerable effect on the net income of corporations,
and it is in principle in the best interest of MNCs to reduce their worldwide tax
burden by relocating profits within their group to lower-taxed affiliates.
The increasing internationalization of business activities in combination with
the growing importance of the digital economy can create conflicts for the tax-
ation of business profits by local governments [21]. For cross-border businesses’
activities, an appropriate allocation of foreign and domestic profits and the un-
derlying capital to the involved jurisdictions is necessary, in accordance with
the principle of economic allegiance [13]. MNCs represent an economic entity,
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but they are usually organized as a conglomerate of legally independent sepa-
rate legal entities or permanent establishments. The direct method to allocate
profits and costs follows the separate entity approach and requires corporate
divisions to behave as independent market participants, whereas the indirect
method follows the unitary entity approach and allocates profits to affiliates by
a formulary apportionment. The prevailing method in the international tax sys-
tem is both for separate legal entities and permanent establishments the direct
method which requires the application of the arms length principle to intra-group
transactions [20]. However, for many intermediary goods, services, and license
contracts within MNCs, no independent reference market is observable and the
implementation of the arms length principle can be difficult.
Intuitively, MNCs have an incentive to allocate profits and costs in a tax-
efficient way to reduce the overall tax burden of the corporation [7]. Tax reduc-
tion has a positive effect on the consolidated net income of MNCs which increases
shareholder value. Efficient tax systems are in theory required to be neutral
regarding any investment decision, but the diverse application of international
taxation principles leads to a considerable heterogeneity between national tax
systems [2]. Taxes represent costs for corporations, thus, MNCs usually consider
tax effects intensively and pursue substantive and formal tax planning activities
to change and structure economic activities in a tax-efficient way.
The term tax planning refers to generally accepted strategies to minimize tax
liabilities of MNCs. Up to now, it is not precisely defined which tax planning
strategies are considered as “aggressive”. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) defines them as planning activities with
“unintended and unexpected tax revenue consequences” [19]. In general, “ag-
gressive” tax planning strategies are said to be in line with legal provisions but
these strategies might be able to considerably reduce the tax burden of MNCs in
some regions. In the following, the term “aggressive” refers to legal tax planning
strategies of MNCs that lead to a substantial reduction of their tax liabilities
[11]. Tax planning has to be differentiated from the terminology of tax avoid-
ance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance strategies exploit loopholes in the tax law
to reduce the tax liability. Tax evasion refers to any illegal activities to minimize
the tax burden (e.g. misstatements in the tax declaration) [7].
MNCs are usually not one business entity, but a network of parent and child
companies and holdings across different countries. Therefore, they can be directly
represented in a knowledge graph (KG) [5], i.e., a graph describing entities and
their relations [23]. In such a KG, companies can be connected among each other
as well as to the countries they belong to, and further information (such as com-
panies’ legal forms, countries’ populations and GDP etc.) can be added. Such a
KG allows for two kinds of analyses: First, companies using certain aggressive
tax planning strategies can be identified in the graph, since they correspond to
characteristic subgraph patterns. Second, the graph can be analyzed for anoma-
lies, which might hint at tax avoidance strategies, which are not yet known.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the knowl-
edge graph used for our analysis and its sources. Section 3 demonstrates the
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above mentioned use cases, i.e., the identification of aggressive tax planning
strategies and the search for graph anomalies. Section 4 discusses relevant re-
lated work, and section 5 closes with a summary and an outlook on future work.
2 Knowledge Graph
For our analysis, we combine data from different sources into a knowledge graph,
which can then be queried for analytics purposes.
2.1 Data Sources
The main source of our KG is the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation4.
GLEIF collects data from different legal entity identifier (LEI) issuers and pro-
vides a consolidated collection of that data. For each legal entity, different data
fields (such as address, legal form, etc.) are collected. GLEIF has two levels of
data: level 1 data (who is who) contains data about the companies as such,
whereas level 2 data (who owns whom) provides information about the relation-
ships between companies.
The level 2 data contains both direct as well as ultimate subsidiaries, i.e.,
child companies of child companies and so on. The latter is, in theory, equivalent
to following the transitive closure of the subsidiary relation, however, in some
cases, there are subsidiaries missing in between in the data for various reasons
(e.g., country specific regulations for disclosing that information).
For further analyses, we include economic and geographic data for the en-
tities at hand. To that end, country-specific data from the World Bank5 and
Wikidata [31] is collected. Those country-wide indicators include population and
GDP. Moreover, we included the statutory corporate tax rate for each country
from the OECD corporate tax database6.
Since some data was imported from Wikidata, we also provide interlinks to
Wikidata. Countries and companies were trivial to match, since for the former,
the GLEIF dataset uses ISO codes also present in Wikidata7, whereas for the
latter, GLEIF identifiers are also used in Wikidata.8. Using that approach, we
could interlink all countries and a total of 20,734 companies to Wikidata.
For matching cities, first, candidates are retrieved from Wikidata based on
postal codes. To that end, a list of all entities with postal codes was retrieved from
Wikidata, and attribute values with ranges are preprocessed to get an actual map
of postal codes to entities (e.g., Berlin has only one value for the postal code
attribute with value 10115-141999). To deal with entities that do not represent
4 https://www.gleif.org/en/
5 https://data.worldbank.org/
6 https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/corporate-tax-statistics-database.
htm
7 https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Property:P297
8 https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Property:P1278
9 https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q64
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Fig. 1: Example representation of a company and its direct parents in the taxa-
tion graph
a city (e.g., streets or libraries) and with cases where multiple candidates exist
(e.g., 1000 is the postal code for Brussels, Sofia, Ljubljana, among others), the
matching was made based on edit distance, with a maximum threshold of 0.3.
Using that approach, we were able to link 43,832 cities to Wikidata.10
One basic design decision is collecting the data in one knowledge graph,
vs. using SPARQL federated queries for Wikidata and Worldbank data. After
some initial experiments with Virtuoso’s query federation functionality, we found
that federated queries are possible, but significantly slower than local queries.
Hence, we follow a mixed approach: data about central entities (such as the
population and GDP for countries) are included in our knowledge graph, while
still maintaining the possibility to use the full data in Wikidata via federation.
2.2 Resulting Graph
The resulting graph contains about 1.5M companies and 180k relationships be-
tween those companies, as shown in table 1. An example representation of a
company is shown in Fig. 1. Overall, the graph has 22,839,123 triples and is
stored in a Virtuoso RDF store [8]. The knowledge graph is available online for
browsing, download, and querying via a SPARQL endpoint.11
As depicted in Fig. 3, the distribution of direct and ultimate children follows
a power law distribution. There are a few companies with very high number of
ultimate children, as shown in table 2, whereas the majority has only one or no
ultimate children, as shown in Fig. 11. Companies with children have on average
2.6 direct children and 4.1 ultimate children (i.e., members of the transitive
10 The full code for generating the knowledge graph is available online at https://
github.com/tax-graph/taxgraph.
11 http://taxgraph.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/
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Table 1: Contents of the Knowledge Graph
Class Count
Company 1,491,143
Country 225
City 95,306
Legal Form 1,286
Relation Count
direct subsidiary 87,020
ultimate subsidiary 96,465
Table 2: Top 10 Companies with the most ultimate children
Company No. of ultimate children
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 2,534
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 885
Morgan Stanley 793
Citigroup Inc. 686
Lloyds Banking Group PLC 680
Aegon N.V. 629
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Public Limited Company 496
HSBC Holdings PLC 472
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 455
Societe Generale 429
closure of the child relation). The longest chains of subsidiaries that we find
spans across six companies, as shown in Fig. 1: Here, the ultimate child has a
legal address in the Cayman Islands.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of legal and headquarter addresses. While the
distribution among the top legal and headquarter addresses is similar, we can ob-
serve that two tax havens, i.e., Cayman Islands (KY) and British Virgin Islands
(VG), appear among the top legal addresses, but not among the top headquar-
ter addresses. For 36,400 of all companies in the graph (2.4%), the headquarter
and legal address country differ; the majority of legal addresses in this set are
the Cayman Islands (9,838), British Virgin Islands (5,878), Ireland (2,496), and
Luxembourg (2,389). The most common combination is a headquarter address
in the USA and a legal address in the Cayman Islands, as depicted in Fig. 2.
When comparing the corporate tax rates in the legal and headquarter ad-
dresses’ countries, it can be observed that the corporate tax rate in the legal
address country is, on average, 0.24 percentage points lower than in the head-
quarter’s country. When considering only the 36,400 companies with differing
addresses, that difference is even 10.5 percentage points. As depicted in Fig. 6,
companies having their headquarter and legal address in different countries have
a higher tendency of using a legal address in a lower-tax country.
For subsidiary relations between companies, 35.7% of those are multinational,
i.e., the legal address country of the subsidiary and its affiliate differ. Fig. 5 de-
6 N. Ldemann et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Most frequent headquarter (left) and legal address country (right) for
companies where headquarter and legal address are in different countries.
picts the most common relations for such multinational relationships. It can
be observed that Ireland, India, and Singapore appear among the top 10 sub-
sidiaries, but not among the top 10 parents.
When looking at the corporate tax rates for multinational companies, it can
again be observed that the tax rate in which the subsidiary is located is typically
lower than the one of the consolidating company. Across all subsidiary relations,
the corporate tax rate in the child company’s country is by 0.62 percentage points
lower than in the parent company’s country; if restricting this to multinational
relations (i.e., where the parent and child company have their legal address in
different countries), the difference is 2.46 percentage points.
3 Usage Examples
The knowledge graph can be used both for finding evidence for well-known tax
avoidance strategies, as well as for searching for anomalies in the graph which
hint at avoidance strategies not yet known.
3.1 Tax Avoidance Strategies
Well-known strategies for tax avoidance can be observed in the graph and for-
mulated as query patterns and graph queries.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of the number of direct and ultimate children per company
US GB DE IT NL ES FR 
DK SE LU CA IN FI BE 
NO AT KY VG PL other
(a) Legal address
US GB DE IT NL ES FR 
DK SE LU CA IN FI BE 
NO AT PL CH IE other
(b) Headquarter address
Fig. 4: Distribution of legal and headquarter addresses
Double Irish with a Dutch Arrangement The Double Irish with a Dutch
Arrangement uses in essence three companies: Two companies are located in
Ireland (company A and C) and a conduit entity in the Netherlands (company
B). Yet, the Irish fiscal authority considers only company A as taxable in Ireland,
the second company is tax resident in a tax haven (company C). This allows to
attribute all revenues to a tax haven (company C). [10,14]
Fig. 7 depicts the query for a Double Irish with a Dutch Arrangement. Note
that since further intermediate companies might be involved, we allow for chains
of ownership by using tgp:isDirectlyConsolidatedBy+. Since the data in our
knowledge graph is not complete, we could not find direct evidence for the Double
Irish with a Dutch Arrangement construct. However, removing the last condition
of the query (i.e., that company C has to have its headquarter in Ireland) yields
19 results (with the headquarter of C being located in countries such as the
8 N. Ldemann et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Most frequent headquarter of parent (left) and child company’s legal
address country (right) for multinational subsidiary relations.
UK, the US, Japan, or Finland), which might hint at other variants of that tax
planning strategy.
Duck-Rabbit Construct Countries implement different legislative regulations
which can have the unintended consequence that hybrid entities emerge. The
OECD considers hybrid entities as firms with a dual residency and no country
recognizes the entity as taxable. [16,22] These constructs are called duck-rabbit
construct in the following, named after the optical illusion in which some people
see a duck, and some see a rabbit12. The structure can be as follows: a company C
in the Netherlands having the legal form of a BV (a private limited partnership)
is the child of a company B in a tax haven, which in turn is the ultimate child
of some international company A, usually located in the US. In that case, the
Dutch laws consider B a company under US tax legislation, while the US laws
consider B a company under Dutch tax legislation, which ultimately leads to the
company being taxed in none of the two countries.
The corresponding graph pattern and query are shown in Fig 8. Running this
query against the graph returns three constructs using the Bermudas and one
using the Cayman Islands as an offshore tax haven. Among the former, there
12 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabbit-duck_illusion
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Fig. 6: Corporate tax differences between headquarter and legal address (upper
part) and parent and child companies’ addresses (lower part). The left hand side
diagrams depict all companies, the right hand side diagrams are filtered to those
where the two countries are different.
is also the game company Activision, which has become one of the well-known
examples for this kind of tax avoidance strategy.13
3.2 Graph Anomalies
Since we included additional data about countries in our graph, we can use this
as background information for further interesting observations [27]. One of those
observations is the density of companies per state.
Table 3 depicts the top 10 countries by companies per capita and companies
per GDP. It can be observed that many known tax havens appear in the top
positions, with some values being clearly out of range (e.g., Liechtenstein lists
one company per three inhabitants).
In the table of companies per capita, Denmark appears to be a bit of an outlier
at first glance. Digging a bit deeper, we found that private holding companies –
so called Anpartselskab – in Denmark are not taxed under certain conditions, and
the creation of such companies is even advertised as a means for tax planning.14
While this finding was new to the domain experts in the team, and we have not
been able to fully explain the Denmark anomaly, we can, as of today, only find
that “something is rotten in the state of Denmark.” [29]
13 https://thecorrespondent.com/6942
14 See, e.g., https://www.offshorecompany.com/company/denmark-holding/
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WHERE {
?a tgp:isDirectlyConsolidatedBy+ ?b .
?b tgp:isDirectlyConsolidatedBy+ ?c .
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?c tgp:headquartersAddressCountry ?tgc:IE .
}
Fig. 7: Double Irish Arrangement
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SELECT *
WHERE {
?b tgp:headquartersAddressCountry tgc:BM .
?b tgp:isUltimatelyConsolidatedBy ?a .
?c tgp:headquartersAddressCountry tgc:NL .
?c tgp:isDirectlyConsolidatedBy ?b .
?c tgp:legalForm tglf:54M6 .
}
Fig. 8: Duck Rabbit Construction
Another analysis we conducted is related to addresses with high concentra-
tions of companies using that address as a legal address. There are quite a few
addresses which are used as legal addresses by thousands of companies. Examples
for such addresses are shown in Fig. 9.
A particular observation of this analysis is that the two addresses most fre-
quently used as legal addresses are in the state of Delaware, USA. We found that
36.7% of all US companies in our knowledge graph have their legal address in
Delaware, whereas the state only accounts for 0.29% of the total US population.
This phenomenon became known as the Delaware Loophole [32] and is a result
of the Delaware tax legislation, which does not charge income tax on companies
not operating in Delaware. [4] Consequently, only 15.3% of the companies having
their legal address in Delaware also have their headquarter in that state.
3.3 Federated Querying
Although, as discussed above, federated queries for combining data from our
knowledge graph with data from Wikidata are not very fast and scalable, they
are still possible. One example is to use the area of cities – which is included
in Wikidata but not in our KG – and compute the density of companies by
headquarter and legal address in each city. The rationale is that cities exposing
an overly large density are suspicious, similar to the analysis of addresses above.
Figure 10 depicts an example for a federated query using Wikidata. The inner
query collects all cities with a minimum number of companies using that city in
their address, the outer query retrieves the area for those cities from Wikidata
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Table 3: Top 10 countries by companies per inhabitants (top) and per GDP (in
Million USD, bottom). Germany and USA are listed for comparison.
Country Population Companies per capita
Liechtenstein 37,910 0.311
Cayman Islands 64,174 0.237
Luxembourg 607,728 0.063
Isle of Man 84,077 0.036
Bermuda 63,968 0.035
Monaco 38,682 0.017
Marshall Islands 58,413 0.017
Seychelles 96,762 0.011
Denmark 5,797,446 0.009
Saint Kitts and Nevis 52,441 0.008
Germany 82,927,922 0.002
USA 327,167,434 0.001
Country GDP Companies per 1M GDP
Marshall Islands 221,278 4.59
Cayman Islands 5,1413 2.96
Liechtenstein 6,214 1.90
Seychelles 1,590 0.66
Belize 1,871 0.61
Samoa 820 0.57
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 811 0.54
Luxembourg 70,885 0.54
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1,011 0.46
Isle of Man 6,770 0.45
Germany 3,947,620 0.03
USA 20,544,343 0.01
to compute the density of companies in those cities. Table 4 shows the outcome
of that query, showing the top 10 cities according to the density of headquarter
and legal addresses registered. It can be observed that in both cases, Vaduz in
Liechtenstein has the highest density of companies per square kilometer. For the
density of legal addresses, Dover in Delaware shows up in the top list as another
piece of evidence for the already mentioned Delaware Loophole.15
4 Related Work
Parts of GLEIF, which we also used in this paper, have already been ported
to an RDF representation and made available as a Linked Data endpoint [30].
15 The top 10 lists, however, have to be taken with a grain of salt. For a city to appear
in the top 10 list, it requires that (a) we are able to link it to Wikidata using the
approach sketched in section 2, and (b) it has to have its area as a value in Wikidata.
Therefore, those lists cannot be considered complete.
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(a) 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington,
Delaware, USA (14,551 companies)
(b) 251 Little Falls Drive, Wilmington,
Delaware, USA (11,207 companies)
(c) Eastwood House, Glebe Road,
Chelmsford, CM1 1QW, Essex, United
Kingdom (2,265 companies)
(d) 121 South Church Street, George
Town, Cayman Islands (1,639 companies)
Fig. 9: Addresses with the highest frequency of being used as a legal address.
Pictures from Google Street View.
However, the most important information for our use case – i.e., parent and child
relations between companies – are not included in that representation.
Other approaches are restricted to single branches and/or countries, and thus
would not allow for an analysis like the one conducted in this paper. An exam-
ple for a branch specific solution is discussed in [9], where the authors build a
populated ontology of bank holding companies and their ownership relations is
introduced. The authors build an ontology and populated it from the Federal
Reserve’s public National Information Center (NIC) database16. Examples for
country-specific solutions include a knowledge graph of Chinese companies [17],
and a Linked Data endpoint of French business register data [6]. The euBusi-
nessGraph [28] project publishes data about businesses in the EU, but does not
contain relationships between companies. Those datasets are often very detailed,
but are of limited use for analyzing the taxation of multinational companies.
16 https://www.ffiec.gov/NPW
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SELECT ?c ?count ?a (?count/?a as ?density) WHERE {
{ SELECT COUNT(?x) AS ?count ?c WHERE {
?x tgp:headquartersAddressCityID ?c .
}
GROUP BY ?c
HAVING(COUNT(?x)>1000)
}
?c owl:sameAs ?wdc .
SERVICE <https://query.wikidata.org/bigdata/namespace/wdq/sparql> {
?wdc <http://www.wikidata.org/prop/direct/P2046> ?a}
} ORDER BY DESC(?density)
Fig. 10: Example for a federated query using Wikidata
In addition to specific datasets, many cross-domain knowledge graphs also
contain information about companies [26]. Hence, we also looked at such knowl-
edge graphs as potential sources for the analysis at hand. However, since we
need information not only for the main business entities, but also for smaller
subsidiaries in order to identify tax compliance issues, we found that the in-
formation contained in those knowledge graphs is not sufficient for the task at
hand. In Wikidata [31], DBpedia [15], and YAGO [18], the information about
subsidiaries is at least one order of magnitude less frequent than in the graph
discussed in this paper, as shown in Fig. 11: Especially longer chains of sub-
sidiary relations, which are needed in our approach, are hardly contained in
public cross-domain knowledge graphs.
In the tax accounting literature several scholars have already used data on
multinational corporations to analyze the behavior of firms. It has been shown
that some firms fail to publicly disclose subsidiaries that are located in tax
havens [3]. In [1], the authors used very detailed data on the structure of multi-
national corporations to show that the introduction of public country by country
reporting – the requirement to provide accounting information for each coun-
try a firm operates in to tax authorities – leads to a reduction in tax haven
engagement.
A different strand of the tax literature has looked at networks of double
tax treaties. Double tax treaties are in general bilateral agreements between
countries that lower cross-border taxes in case of international transactions of
multinational corporations. This literature on networks shows that some coun-
tries are strategically good choices for conduit entities to relocate profits and
minimize cross-border taxation [12,25].
5 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper, we have introduced a knowledge graph for multinational compa-
nies and their interrelations. We have shown that the graph allows for finding
14 N. Ldemann et al.
Table 4: Cities with largest densities of companies having registered their head-
quarter (upper half) and legal address (lower half)
City Country No. of companies Area in sq. km. Density
Vaduz Liechtenstein 9021 17.30 521.45
Puteaux France 1334 3.19 418.18
Paris France 16276 105.40 154.42
Geneva Switzerland 2153 15.92 135.24
Brussels Belgium 3756 33.00 113.82
Copenhagen Denmark 7356 86.70 84.84
Barcelona Spain 8305 101.30 81.98
Milan Italy 12563 181.67 69.15
Zug Switzerland 1027 21.61 47.52
Nicosia Cyprus 2276 51.06 44.58
Vaduz Liechtenstein 8460 17.30 489.02
Puteaux France 1218 3.19 381.82
Dover USA (Delaware) 11268 60.82 185.28
Paris France 16253 105.40 154.20
Brussels Belgium 4213 33.00 127.67
Geneva Switzerland 1522 15.92 95.60
Copenhagen Denmark 7432 86.70 85.72
Barcelona Spain 8095 101.30 79.91
Milan Italy 12599 181.67 69.35
Zug Switzerland 1052 21.61 48.68
companies using specific constructs, such as well-known aggressive tax planning
strategies, as well as for identifying further anomalies.
Our current knowledge graph uses company data from GLEIF, which is
openly available and encompasses about 1.5M business entities. There are other
(non-open) databases such as ORBIS [24], which contain even more than 40M
business entities, but their licenses do not allow for making them available as
a public knowledge graph. For the future, we envision the dual development of
an open and a closed version of the graph, the latter based on larger, but non-
public data. On the larger graph, we expect to find more evidence for known tax
planning strategies and a larger number of interesting anomalies.
Another interesting source of information would be the mining of up to date
information from news sites such as Reuters or Financial Times. This would
allow feeding and updating the KG with recent information, and to directly rate
events in the restructuring of multinational companies in the light of whether or
not it is likely that those events happen for reasons of tax planning.
Apart from increasing the mere size of the graph, we also plan to include more
diverse data in the graph. For example, adding branch information for companies
would allow for more fine-grained analyses finding tax planning strategies, which
are specific to particular branches. Further data about companies could include
the size of companies (in terms of employees), or other quantitative revenue data
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Fig. 11: Chains of subsidiaries by number of hops
mined from financial statements, and a detailed hierarchy of subsidiary relations
describing the relations more closely (e.g., franchise, licensee, holding).
A particular challenge lies in the more detailed representation of taxation
legislation. For the moment, we have only included average corporate tax rates
as a first approximation, but having more fine grained representations in the
knowledge graph would be a clear improvement. However, this requires some up-
front design considerations, since the ontological representation of tax legislation
is not straight forward.
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